In this paper optimal strategies are derived for the choice by several players of a set of sequentially observed random variables. The players are permitted to have any utility functions on the chosen random variables, and any opinion on the joint distribution of the sequence of random variables, provided these utility functions and opinions are known to all palyers. A random variable is chosen if enough players want it to be chosen, in a sense made precise.
Introduction
Suppose that K players observe a sequence of n vectors X., (i=l, ... ,n)
of arbitrary length L, of which they will select r, l~r<_n. Suppose that after each vector has been observed, the players, each in turn in an arbitrary order, must announce whether he wishes to accept the vector. If the set of players wishing to accept the vector is a member of a winning class W(satisfying (i) {1,2, ... ,K}e:W, (ii) i f Pe:W and P':::>P then P'e:W and (iii) W does not depend on the order in which the plaj~rs announce their preferences), then the vector is accepted as one of the r selected vectors. If the players selected m, 0< ~ r-l of the first n-r+m random variables X., then they are forced to --~ select the last r-m of them, Once rejected, a vector cannot later be selected; once selected, a vector cannot later be rejected. Each vector values Yl"'" Yr' we let ~(Yl"'" Yr) denote the utility function of the kth player, l::J<.~_K. Both these utility functions and each player's joint distribution on (Xl"'" X ) is assumed known to all K players. Hence each player
'" ",n k is assumed to make decisions in order to maximize ~ ( ~ (~l' ... , ~r»' where ~ denotes the expectation with respect to the joint distribution of (~l"'" X ) assigned by player k. in what order the players announce their preferences. Additionally he conjectures that reversibility holds for arbitrary K, and our purpose is to prove this in the context outlined above.
The problem discussed here differs from the case in which the number of rejections allowed to each party is fixed in advance, and is less than n-r. and much earlier by Cayley [1875] . In those problems, a sequential random sample of independent and identically distributed variables Zl' Z2"" is to be observed without recall by a single de,::ision maker. The decision maker must choose a stopping rule N in order to maximi~e E(ZN)' There is a given upper bound n on the number of observations that can be taken; if the decision maker has not stopped before the value of Zn has been observed, then he must stop and accept that value as his payoff. This problem of optimum selection is a special case of the problem in this paper in which only one observation is to be chosen (r=l), the observed vectors Xl"'" Xn are independent and identically distributed, there is only one player (K=l), and Zi=~l(Xi) for i=1,2, •.. , n.
Gilbert and ~ste1ler [1966] also consider the problem in which r obsE!rvations must be selected out of the total of n variables to be observed sequentially, without recall, and the payoff to the decision maker is the sum of the r selected observations. This is again a special case in which K=l, and the r utility function takes the special form
In section. 2 of this paper, the assumptions on the random variables Xl" .. , X n , the definition of the optimal behavior, and the backwards induction '\, '\, approach are di.scussed. Section 3 proves the pri.ncipal result and discusses its consequenCE!S.
Backwards Induction
We assume that each player can represent his view of the process generating the sequence Xl"'" X by assigning to it a joint probability distribu-
tion. This distribution need not be the same for the players, but it is assumed that each player knows the distri.butions aSSigned to all the other players. Some important special cases of these joint distributions are of special interest:
(A) The random variables Xl' X 2 , ... , X might be independent and identi-'\, '\, '\,n cally distributed with a particular known distribution agreed on by all the players.
(B) The random variables Xl' X 2 , •.. , X might be independent and identi-'\, '\, '\,n cally distributed with different distributions assigned by each player.
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In this case, each player would believe that its own distribution is more appropriate than the distributions assigned by the other players. is unknown to all players, and each player ass igns a prior dis tribution to 8.
The players mi.ght agree on the conditional distribution of Xl' ... ' X given 8,
but disagree on the prior distribution to be assigned to 8. In this case each player is assumed to know the priors assigned to 8 by each other p1aye.r. Each player will then update his own distribution for 6 after each random variable X is observed, which will affect the joint distribution for the remaining X's
The assumption that the joint distributions of X, , ... , X assigne.d by each
player is known to every player includes all these special cases and, of course, many more.
We now define what we mean by optimal strategies for the players in this game. Consider the last possible decision that could arise, when r-l of the st variables have been chos4~n, the n-1 random variable is being considered, and all the players except one has announced his decision. If the process has not terminated before this state is reached, then the player with this last decision to announce has a wel1-dE~fined optimal decision for each possible value x 1 of 'Un -X 1.
'U nUnder the assumption that this last possible choice will be made optima11y, the consequences of the next-to-last possible decision are known, and hence it can be made optimally also. By backwards induction, each dec.ision can be made optimally under the assumption that all players will act optimally in all possible subsequent decisions. The optimal procedure is taken to be the one resulting from all these optimal actions of both sides.
AnalysiS of the game
Suppose that Xl' .
•• " X have been observed, some of whom may have been bution of X +1"'" X given Xl" .. , X now becomes relevant for each player
and (iii) only r-r' vectors X out of the remaining n-p must be selected.
Cv
We require a notation for the expect,~d utility to each side of the optimal strategies given the history hp This might be denoted Ek(1j!k 1hp) , but on some occasions it will be useful to emphasize particular aspects of the history h .
p Thus for example we might write ~(ljiklhp' r-r', n-p) to indicate the expect.ed utility to player k after the history h , where there are r-r' vectors rep maining to be chosen out of the last n-p vectors X.
'"
Suppose that some history h already happened, and let X +1 x be the next p ~ vector observed. Let be the worth to player k of the situation in which x is rejected, and let be the worth to player k of the situation in which x is accepted.
Note that Fk and C k do not depend on the order in which the players in round p+l announce their choices, but only on whether, after all the announcements, X is accpeted or not. ",p+l This would not be the case if a player could learn from the other player's choices, and so might be able to make a more informed choice going last than going first. However since under this model .both the utility function and joint distribution of every player is known to every player, the optimal decision can be predicted with certainty and hence the announcements have no informational content.
For player k, if Fk>C k he hopes the observation ~p+l will be rejected;
if Fk<C k he hopes it will be accepted. If Fk=C k an ambiguous situation results in which the outcome is indifferent for player k.
The assumption on the winning class W that if PEW and P ':::>p then p' EW is precisely the eondition needed in this context to ensure that strategic voting in the sense of Satterwaite [1973 Satterwaite [ , 1975 and Gibbard [1973] is not optimal.
Thus if Fi?C k , player k will announce for rejection; i f Fk>C k , player k will announce for acceptance. In order not to burden our analysis and notation excessively, we assume that player k will announce for rejection only when strictly necessary, :i,.e. when Fk'.>C k .
Then the set of players for acceptance is {kl Fk.::.C k }. If this set is a member of the l.rinning class W, then the observation X 1 is accepted, and other-",p+ wise not.
Note that the class W need not be symmetric in the set of players.
Thus, for instance if K=3, the class W = {{1,2}, {1,3}, {1,2,3}} obeys the axioms for W, and says that for a vector X to be accepted, player 1 and (player Because whether an observation X will be accepted can be predicted with 'V certainty, an alternative optimal strategy is that every player will announce a willingness to accept the observation if {kl F~Ck}£W' and otherwise no player will. This leads to apparent unanimity, as stressed in S in the analysis of Case 1.
To say that the optimal strategies can be found by backwards induction is not to say that the necessary calculations are a trivial matter in a specific context. In S some calculations are given for Cases 1 and 2.
Finally we remark that it appears to m1 from this analysis that the critical assumptions needed to make reversibility obtain -'ire 1) that the utility functions and joint distributions of every player are known to all, which assures that the optimal decision of each player can be calculated by every other player, and consequently his decision carries no information, and 2) that cost structure does not penalize a player for rejecting a vector that other players would reject for it. The first set of assumptions, but not the second, are also satisfied by the. problems considered in DK.
Similarly in the case K=L, one might suppose that player k observes only th the K component of X, and that his utility that players announcing e,arlier might find it optimal to use this fact to mislead players announcing later, leading to a game of great complexity.
